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tude of Article 665; the Supreme Court reversed and remanded.
Property on Lake Pontchartrain is not a priori subject to a public servitude for levees under Article 665. At the same time, it
does not follow that it may not be subject to this servitude. However, the burden of proof is on the levee board to show that the
property "is within range of the reasonable necessities of the
by the forces of nature, unaided by artisituation, as produced
12
ficial causes.'
SUCCESSIONS
HarrietS. Daggett*
Succession of Ryan' is concerned with the question of revocation of a principal will by a later one valid in form but allegedly
containing a prohibited substitution and hence invalid in substance. The matter was argued on an exception of no right of
action brought by a niece of the testatrix claiming only as a
legatee under the prior will. Thus, the question of whether or
not the language of the second will should be interpreted as a
substitution was not passed upon. On rehearing the court held
that the first will was tacitly revoked by the second which was
valid in form and indicated a change of intention by the testatrix whether the bequest showing this change could be executed
or not.
This distinction between invalidity of form and substance
adds further complexity to the question of revocation of wills, an
already most disturbing subject. The historical and legislative
intent approach was taken in arriving at the conclusion. Article
1519 of the Revised Civil Code of 1870 states that "those [conditions] which are contrary to the laws . . . are reputed not written." If the bequest in the later will was a prohibited substitution (which was not passed upon) and thus "not written," the
later will might have been said to be bare of substance and thus
not to have exhibited a change of intention by the testatrix. The
author of the opinion on first hearing, wherein this distinction
between form and substance was not found, dissented on the rehearing.
12. 87 So.2d at 754.
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 228 La. 447, 82 So.2d 759 (1955).
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In Succession of Hemenway2 decedent husband left a will
leaving everything of which he died possessed to his wife. Counsel agreed that the will was valid in form, that his forced heirs
could reduce to the disposable portion and that if a fidei commissum was found to be contained in the testament it would be
regarded as not written. Thus, the issues were really only those
of community versus separate property. The first item had to
do with a bank account wherein separate property of the decedent, inherited from his father, had been commingled with community property to the extent that it must be considered community property under the strong presumption. Succession of
Land3 could not save the cause for separate property for in that
case the sum commingled was so small as not to warrant the conclusion that the separate account had lost its character. Such was
not the situation in the instant factual situation. Stocks and
bonds clearly traceable to inheritance from the husband's father
were declared separate property. This was also true of shares
of stock which had been split as was the case of dividends from
the ancestor's stock.
Stock purchased wholly with funds derived from sale of inherited stock were declared to be separate property, an interesting point because apparently no double declaration, required by
the husband in purchase of an immovable, was in evidence.
Shares of stock issued by virtue of a reorganization of the corporation as substitutes for stock owned as separate property
were declared separate under settled jurisprudence. Title to
stock purchased with community funds or with commingled
funds were declared community assets with a debt by the community to the separate estate for funds of the separate estate so
used. Stock of which the title could not be properly traced was
declared community. A one-half interest in realty wherein the
deceased had failed to state that it was acquired with his separate property and for his separate benefit was, under well-settled
jurisprudence, declared to be community property. The attempt
to oust the mother as testamentary executrix because of alleged
acts of bad faith failed as her actions had been above board in
the several situations cited.
In 1954 the Supreme Court of Louisiana decided in Succession of Reynolds4 that a will was not invalid for uncertainty of
2. 228 La. 572, 83 So.2d 377 (1955).
3. 212 La. 103, 31 So.2d 609 (1947).
4. 228 La. 640, 83 So.2d 885 (1955).
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date because of a change in the year from 1945 to 1948 by a surcharge made by the testatrix of one numeral. The superimposed
number eight was clear and the court found the will to be
valid and as of 1948. On the final page of the will 1945 was
given as the date but the court found that a sequence of dates
is not necessary, nor do two dates make the will invalid for uncertainty. The plaintiffs in that case now appear again, pleading that the court found two wills of the same date, August 3,
1945, which revoke each other leaving the estate an intestate one.
The court reiterated their first decision that the will was one of
1948 after pointing out inconsistencies in the many pleadings.
The exception of no cause of action was sustained.
In Cotton v. Washburn5 a young man engaged to be married
bought property in his name and that of his fiancee. Shortly
thereafter, the parties were married and until the wife left occupied the premises that had been purchased. She secured a divorce
and sued to have the property partitioned by licitation. The defendant urged that the property had been purchased with his
separate funds and asked to have the deed reformed. In the alternative, he asked for a judgment for one-half the purchase
price and a declaration of ownership of half of the property. The
court held that a donation in anticipation of marriage had been
made by the prospective husband - that the marriage had taken
place, thus fulfilling the condition and that acceptance was instanced by occupation of the premises, a corporeal possession
thereof. The sale was by authentic act naming the parties. Thus,
all formalities for a donation of one-half of the immovable property were met. The partition was granted.
A nuncupative will by public act was declared null in Succession of LafferanderieO for want of mental capacity of the testatrix at the time the will was made. The burden of proof was
sustained by those attacking the testament. Indeed, the evidence
was overwhelming. The court observed that ordinarily great
weight is given to the opinions of the notary and four witnesses,
but here the notary did not know the testatrix and the witnesses
were close to the sole and universal legatee. These persons only
testified in favor of mental capacity.
In Succession of Bishop7 action was brought to have a sale declared simulated or fraudulent and the property inventoried as
5. 228 La. 832, 84 So.2d 208 (1955).
6. 228 La. 871, 84 So.2d 442 (1955).
7. 228 La. 994, 84 So.2d 613 (1955).
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part of the estate of the first husband and deceased father of
plaintiffs. One of the plaintiffs was administrator of the succession. The sale had been made by the deceased and his second wife
to the latter's daughter by a previous marriage. It was proved
that the vendee had given money and services over a period of
twenty years which far exceeded the down payment on the property. Thus, the sale was not simulated. The plea of fraud of
forced heirs as "creditors" had no merit, as they are not "creditors." Cases cited in support of that theory had to do with suits
to reduce gifts in excess of the forced portion.
In Succession of Maguire8 a testatrix left a will containing a
trust for girls under the charitable and educational purposes of
the acts of Louisiana. Included therein, however, was an attempt to allocate a certain amount to a cousin. Attack was made
by a brother, heir at law, to have the will declared invalid as it
attempted a "mixed trust" not allowed by the statutes and Constitution of Louisiana. The cousin had died before the testatrix
and the court upheld the trust despite the wide discretion given
to trustees. The provision in favor of the cousin was said to have
been merely "precatory" in any case.
Succession of Rolling9 instances an interpretation of two wills
and a codicil to the first one. The issue was whether the last will,
being in conflict or otherwise, tacitly revoked the preceding will
and codicil. The court, after most careful analysis of the three
instruments, concluded that the last will expressed the intention
of the testator revoking any possible conflicts and thus should
govern the distribution. It was shown that very little "favoritism" was shown the daughter and that in general the estate was
distributed equally among the children.
In Succession of Alstock' ° a widow in community was appointed administratrix of her deceased husband's estate. A
brother of deceased opposed. The court found that an administrator was needed as claims against the separate estate by the
community for improvements placed upon the separate estate
with community funds would have to be examined as would a
claim by the widow as widow in necessitous circumstances. The
brother had sold all of his interest to his attorney and having no
pecuniary interest could not interfere in the management of the
8. 228 La. 1096, 85 So.2d 4 (1956).
9. 229 La. 727, 86 So.2d 687 (1956).
10. 230 La. 167, 88 So.2d 14 (1956).
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estate. The court found it "unconscionable for the attorney of
this opponent to purchase the right, title and interest of his client
and thereafter file an opposition in the name of said client.""
COMMUNITY PROPERTY
Harriet S. Daggett*
A settlement of community after dissolution by judgment for
separation is under consideration in Daigre v. Daigre.' Two
most interesting issues are presented, that of a stock dividend
and a pension.
The husband owned certain stock in the Coca-Cola Company
when he was married. Later, during the marriage, a stock
dividend was declared by the company. The wife claimed half
of the additional shares as community property. An exhaustive
and scholarly discussion of the nature of a stock dividend as
distinguished from cash dividends from any source appears in
the opinion. The court held that stock dividends are not income;
that they do not alter the recipient's share in the corporation
but merely express it in a different number of units representing
the same original holding. Thus, the stock dividends were not
community but the separate property of the husband who had
brought them into the marriage.
The value of the company and hence that of the husband's
holdings in it had definitely increased since his marriage, but it
had not resulted from the labor, industry, or expenditures of
either spouse under Article 2408 of the Code and hence was not
community property.
The discussion of the nature of the pension received after
marriage is also clear, rewarding, and satisfying. The court
stated that the arrangement made by a company for a pension
must be examined in every case. If it is established by contract
with the employee as an anticipated right of deferred compensation, then obviously it is income from labor of the husband
and would fall into the community. If it is optional to the company, even though in recognition of services previously performed, it is a gratuity and separate property of the husband.
11. 230 La. 167, 88 So.2d 15 (1956).
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 228 La. 682, 83 So.2d 900 (1955).

